0f2a9743f2
cargo audit finds one advisory (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, no fix). Assessed not exploitable here: server only verifies RSA signatures, holds no private key. Session, Google verification, rate limit, backup posture documented alongside.
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
Security notes
Audited 2026-10-13 with cargo audit (1307 advisories, 333 crates).
RUSTSEC-2023-0071: rsa crate, Marvin timing sidechannel (medium, no fix)
The rsa crate (via jsonwebtoken's rust_crypto feature, used to verify
Google ID-token signatures) has no fixed upgrade. Assessment for this
service: the Marvin attack recovers private keys through a decryption
timing oracle. This server only performs public-key verification of
Google-issued tokens; it holds no RSA private key and never decrypts or
signs with RSA. The vulnerable operation does not occur here. Accepted risk,
revisit if an upstream fix lands or if private-key RSA use is added.
Session handling
- Sessions are random 128-bit tokens in HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookies, 30-day expiry. No passwords exist; email sign-in is deliberately low-assurance (any name + email starts a local-only account).
- Google sign-in verifies ID-token signature, audience, issuer, expiry,
and email_verified server-side;
stateis single-use, 10-minute expiry. - Autosave is per-user rate-limited (30/min) to protect SQLite's writer.
Data handling
- All data stays on the host's SQLite file. No analytics, no third-party trackers. CDN dependencies (KaTeX, Google Fonts, Google Identity Services) load from their CDNs only on pages that need them.
- Daily backups:
deploy/termux-backup.sh(VACUUM INTO, 7-day rotation).