0f2a9743f2
cargo audit finds one advisory (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, no fix). Assessed not exploitable here: server only verifies RSA signatures, holds no private key. Session, Google verification, rate limit, backup posture documented alongside.
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security notes
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Audited 2026-10-13 with `cargo audit` (1307 advisories, 333 crates).
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## RUSTSEC-2023-0071: rsa crate, Marvin timing sidechannel (medium, no fix)
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The `rsa` crate (via `jsonwebtoken`'s `rust_crypto` feature, used to verify
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Google ID-token signatures) has no fixed upgrade. Assessment for this
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service: the Marvin attack recovers **private** keys through a decryption
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timing oracle. This server only performs **public-key verification** of
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Google-issued tokens; it holds no RSA private key and never decrypts or
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signs with RSA. The vulnerable operation does not occur here. Accepted risk,
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revisit if an upstream fix lands or if private-key RSA use is added.
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## Session handling
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- Sessions are random 128-bit tokens in HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookies,
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30-day expiry. No passwords exist; email sign-in is deliberately
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low-assurance (any name + email starts a local-only account).
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- Google sign-in verifies ID-token signature, audience, issuer, expiry,
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and email_verified server-side; `state` is single-use, 10-minute expiry.
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- Autosave is per-user rate-limited (30/min) to protect SQLite's writer.
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## Data handling
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- All data stays on the host's SQLite file. No analytics, no third-party
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trackers. CDN dependencies (KaTeX, Google Fonts, Google Identity
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Services) load from their CDNs only on pages that need them.
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- Daily backups: `deploy/termux-backup.sh` (VACUUM INTO, 7-day rotation).
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